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In September 2015, a scandal of Enron-esque 
proportions hit international headlines. The US 
Environmental Protection Agency had found that 
German car manufacturing giant Volkswagen 
AG was intentionally installing sophisticated 
software in their diesel vehicles to evade 
emissions tests. 
More concerning, Volkswagen CEO Martin 
Winterkorn initially opted to blame a handful 
of “rogue engineers” when he testiﬁed before 
a US congressional committee. The ensuing 
fallout of this ‘diesel dupe’ was that Winterkorn 
resigned; shares fell by about a third since the 
scandal broke; and now, the carmaker is being 
sued for €3.3 billion (US$4.07 billion; 2017) in 
Germany by institutional investors.
It is when such enormous failures in corporate 
social responsibility are unceremoniously 
thrown into the spotlight that we are reminded 
of the importance of a solid corporate 
governance framework, says Professor Toru 
Yoshikawa of SMU's Lee Kong Chian School of 
Business, who studies corporate governance 
of listed companies in Asia.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN JAPAN
An interesting observation Professor Yoshikawa 
has made is that some companies in the region 
are starting to embrace an American style 
of corporate governance, especially after the 
1997 ﬁnancial crisis.
“In the US, the CEO looks out for shareholders’ 
interests; he/she cares about shareholders, share 
prices and market value of the company,” he 
explains. “Also, companies in the US are exposed to 
heavy market pressure to assure ﬁnancial returns.”
The professor of strategic management 
studies this phenomenon, called convergence, 
where corporate governance styles start looking 
similar across nations. His ﬁndings have been 
published in a 2009 paper titled ‘Convergence 
of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and 
Future Directions’ by the journal Corporate 
Governance: An International Review.
Japan is a good example of convergence in 
practice, says Professor Yoshikawa. Since Prime 
Minister Shinzō Abe’s party came to power in 
Japan four years ago, he pushed for reform in 
corporate governance, an area he thought the 
country was weak in. Finally, in June 2015, the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) implemented a new 
corporate governance code that requires at least 
two independent external directors to sit on a 
listed company’s board. “This is the ﬁrst time that 
Japan is embracing independent boards,” he says.
However, codes like these give rise to a unique 
hiring problem for Japanese companies, he says. 
Typically, they appoint professional managers, 
retired executives, lawyers, accountants and 
maybe even the odd university professor to the 
board. But, as Professor Yoshikawa points out, 
board functions go beyond legal or accounting 
issues, to providing strategic advice and 
monitoring of the management.
As such, his ongoing large-scale study looks 
at family-controlled, public listed companies 
on the TSE and how receptive they are to 
best practices, and if these might threaten their 
controlling power.
“The family owners [want to] retain the control 
of their own company; therefore, they tend not 
to embrace best practices that can challenge 
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their position as the controlling owner. That’s 
happening everywhere, not only in Japan. 
However, under some circumstances, they do 
accept best practices if they can get information 
from trusted individuals, such as board members 
from other family-owned companies,” Professor 
Yoshikawa says.
COMPLIANCE VARIES BETWEEN BIG AND 
SMALL COMPANIES
His ﬁndings in Japan are in contrast to Singapore, 
which he describes as being “far more advanced” 
in corporate governance strength. In terms of 
structure and competition, Singapore has the 
best corporate governance regime in Asia, he 
believes. For instance, the majority of board 
members are independent in most of Singapore’s 
listed companies.
But still, Professor Yoshikawa says there exists 
a huge gap in corporate governance strength 
between government-linked corporations, such 
as Singapore Telecommunications Limited, and 
smaller family-owned companies, which make 
up 70% to 80% of the companies listed on the 
Singapore Exchange.
He says this discrepancy in compliance is due 
to a lack of resources. “[Small family-owned 
company boards] cannot delegate tasks of the 
committee to other people because they simply 
don’t have the resources,” he says, adding that 
large companies have well-established systems 
in place to carry out compliance responsibilities.
The presence of a controlling owner 
complicates things further. “In small family-
owned companies, family owners are the majority 
shareholder and also serve as CEO,” he says. 
“There [should be] different expectations for 
large companies and small and medium 
enterprises owned by families. You cannot expect 
small family-owned companies to be like Singtel 
or Singapore Airlines.”
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST
As board members are meant to advise on 
business strategies and also monitor managerial 
practices, their relationship with the company 
CEO is just as important as their qualiﬁcations, 
Professor Yoshikawa argues.
In a 2013 paper ‘The Effects of CEO 
Trustworthiness on Directors’ Monitoring and 
Resource Provision’ published in the Journal of 
Business Ethics, Professor Yoshikawa and 
colleagues examined how board members’ 
resource provision and monitoring are affected 
by their perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness.
Their findings revealed that there needs 
to be a certain level of trust between the 
CEO and outside directors for the board to 
function effectively. “Without trust, board 
members do not get all the information they 
need, as the CEO may be uncomfortable sharing 
his innermost thoughts.”
This level of trust only comes with time – one 
that takes at least a year to develop, according 
to Professor Yoshikawa. But, as it takes two hands 
to clap, board members must also be perceived 
as being committed to the board, or otherwise 
the CEO will not listen to their opinions.
“I don’t think many studies mention the human 
side of the CEO-board relationship,” he muses. 
“Without trust, you won’t tell anything that is 
important to you to other people, right? Here, it’s 
the same. After all, [the board is] still a group of 
humans, and so emotions will play a role.” 
